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63CHRISTOPHER J. HEATHERLY : IAN MELENDEZ
ABSTRACT
C
yberspace represents a new domain of warfare unlike any other in military
history. Cyberwarfare practitioners be they state actors, non-state actors or
individual hackers, are capable of tremendous–and readily deniable–damage
to an opponent’s civil or military infrastructure. While recent events have fo-
cused upon the Islamic State’s ability to use the Internet for recruiting purposes, the
real danger to the West comes from its two primary competitors. The Russian and Chi-
nese governments are suspected of using the entire spectrum of cyber warfare as both
a standalone capability as well as effectively incorporating it into the more traditional
domains of war. When faced by so many capable opponents, cyber training takes on
an even greater criticality for U.S. Army officers. This paper focuses on a vital aspect
of the U.S. Army’s overall cyber ability by examining the training provided to Army
officers beginning with their pre-commissioning education and continuing throughout
their careers. It provides recommendations for improvements in officer education to
ensure that future generations of American soldiers are prepared for the exigencies of
cyberwarfare.
INTRODUCTION
The Greek philosopher Plato once said, “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”
While the truth of that statement is eternal, the way war is fought forever evolves. Just
as the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, signaled the end of the
Every Soldier a Cyber Warrior:
The Case for Cyber Education
in the United States Army
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Heatherly
MSIV Cadet Ian Melendez
This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.
“In the future, the cyber threat will equal or even eclipse the terrorist threat.”
[1]
- Robert Mueller, 2013

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THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEWEVERY SOLDIER A CYBER WARRIOR: THE CASE FOR CYBER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
battleship and Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s doctrine
of decisive battle, cyberwar represents a new era and
a new domain of combat. Cyberwar will not be fought
by soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns, or by
those inside tanks or jet aircraft. Nor will cyberwar
have clear front lines separating opponents or even
focusing exclusively upon an enemy’s military ca-
pability. Cyberwar practitioners will employ the full
spectrum of available cyber weapons against multiple
civilian and military targets using a variety of mili-
tary and non-military platforms. Bluntly stated, every
U.S. Army soldier must be ready to fight on the digital
battlefield.
Understanding the threat
The Islamic State’s (ISIS) use of social media and
the dark web to seduce young people across the globe
and spread their message both at home and abroad
are what most American soldiers are familiar with
when it comes to the contemporary war in the cyber
world. While not “hacking” in the traditional sense,
ISIS’ effective use of the cyber world as a recruiting
tool cannot be ignored as an estimated 27,000 foreign
fighters have traveled to Iraq and Syria since 2011.
[2]

Similar ISIS recruiting efforts have found, inspired or
trained a growing number of “home grown” terrorists
who have struck targets across Western Europe and
the United States (US). ISIS’ success does not stem
from robust networks of data but rather the unlimit-
ed and largely unregulated nature of the World Wide
Web. Twitter accounts, Facebook profiles, online pod-
casts, YouTube and other social media platforms all
serve as effective, and often redundant recruiting
tools. While these accounts are quickly shut down by
a host of international policing agencies, they are just
as rapidly and easily reestablished as they are readily
accessible, inexpensive messaging platforms.
While ISIS and other terrorist groups effective so-
cial media strategies, the US’ near-peer competitors,
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Heatherly
enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1994 and earned
his commission via Officer Candidate School
in 1997. He has held a variety of assignments
in special operations, Special Forces, armored,
and cavalry units. His operational experience
includes deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq,
South Korea, Kuwait, Mali, and Nigeria. He
holds master’s degrees from the University of
Oklahoma and the School of Advanced Military
Studies. Additionally, LTC Heatherly is a freelance
author with 80+ published works.

SPRING 2019 |
65CHRISTOPHER J. HEATHERLY : IAN MELENDEZ
Cadet Ian A. Melendez of Sammamish Washing-
ton developed a deep love for history and politi-
cal science at an early age. After graduating from
high school in 2012, he attended Bellevue College
and was involved in the colleges Model United
Nations program. Ian took part in many simula-
tions at an international level and personally lead
the institution to several high-profile Model UN
conferences. Ian transferred to Washington State
University (WSU) in January 2016 and joined the
WSU Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
detachment. Ian is the first cadet to lecture at the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He
will graduate from WSU with a bachelor’s degree
in History and will earn Minors in Political Science
and Military Science. Ian will receive his commis-
sion as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army in
May 2019. He will serve as a military intelligence
officer while pursuing admission to a doctoral
program in history.
China and Russia, present a more capable and dan-
gerous cyberwar threat to the West. For the past 16
years, the US and its allies focused heavily on global
counterterror operations with specific priority placed
upon the Iraqi and Afghan theaters. During this same
period, China and Russia developed, operated, and re-
fined their own cyber capabilities. These nation states
will employ, and indeed have already employed, both
overt and covert means of cyberwarfare using a va-
riety of military, paramilitary, third party, criminal
organizations, and other proxies. Cyberwarfare incor-
porates many forms not all of which will entail a tra-
ditional offensive operation. Many cyber operations
will instead focus upon information or intelligence
gathering in preparation for or in concert with other
traditional forms of attack.
The threat from China
China is a near peer competitor to the US already
expanding its influence across the Asia-Pacific region
with the long-term goal of becoming a global super-
power. While not above using military force in pursuit
of its objectives, the Chinese are masterful at employ-
ing cyber warfare against both military and commer-
cial targets, particularly in information-gathering. To
cite one high profile case, a Chinese national named
Su Bin, spent several years hacking US defense con-
tractors for data on the U.S. Air Force’s newest fight-
er and transport aircraft. This information could be
used to advance China’s own aviation capabilities
through reverse engineering or exploitation of per-
ceived weaknesses in US aircraft. It should be noted
that while the U.S. Department of Justice alleged Su
worked in concert with China’s government, specifi-
cally People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Unit 61938, Bei-
jing denied any involvement.
[3]
Following a lengthy in-
vestigation, in 2016 an American court sentenced Su
to 46 months in prison and a fine of $10,000. Unfor-
tunately, the damage was already done in that China

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THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEWEVERY SOLDIER A CYBER WARRIOR: THE CASE FOR CYBER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
retained the information gathered in these attacks. Su’s cybercrime was hardly unique and
serves as evidence that the PLA has established dedicated units to act on the offensive in the
cyber world. According to the New York Times, Unit 61398 is the source of several deliberate
attacks by the PLA against the US military’s cyber network.
[4]
A US National Intelligence
Estimate, representing the analysis of all 16 US intelligence bodies, pointed to Chinese PLA
officers or civilian contractors working at Unit 61938.
[5]
While many of the details surrounding Unit 61938 are not fully known, such as its per-
sonnel composition, there is little doubt as to its past cyber activities and threat to Western
interests. Unit 61398 is only one example of China’s cyber playbook options. Author Joe
McReynolds describes three different, but complimentary, approaches that Beijing employs
against its competitors. These include operational military units, specialized civilian units
and third party “external entities.”
[6]
Additionally, a 2007 Foreign Policy article estimat-
ed China has 50,000 to 100,000 civilian hackers whose common interests bring them into
occasional partnership with their nation’s government.
[7]
Clearly, these groups represent
a very real, highly skilled and robust danger to US national interests. A 2016 report from
the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission bluntly stated, “among the most
serious threats are China’s efforts at cyber and human infiltration of US national security
entities.”
[8]
The threat from Russia
Another primary US competitor, the resurgent Russian government, is widely believed to
utilize similar tactics in its own cyber arsenal. According to a 2017 Christian Science Moni-
tor article, the Russian government uses criminal computer hackers as proxies against tar-
gets in the West. This tactic provides two tremendous benefits: it ensures Moscow retains
access (and control) over some of the most capable cyber operators and gives the Russians
plausible deniability against Western reprisals.
[9]
The successful employment of cyber warfare, either as a standalone capability or in
conjunction with other systems, is nothing new to the Russian government. Indeed, the
Russians employed cyber in support of conventional attacks during their 2008 invasion
of Georgia–a first in military history. In that engagement, Russia allegedly overwhelmed
Georgia’s internet and computer infrastructure limiting Tbilisi’s ability to coordinate its
defense.
[10]
No doubt their capabilities have improved and perhaps been further refined in
other operations over the past 9 years.
Like China, Russian cyber operations also target non-military entities as evidenced by
the 2010 “cyberbomb” discovered in the NASDAQ exchange.
[11]
A near successful attempt
at what could have been the largest data leak in the history of the US stock market caused
many corporations and investors to seriously question the security of both their data and
personal information, as well as the legitimacy of the market itself.
[12]
During the subse-
quent investigation, the National Security Agency (NSA) successfully traced the attack

SPRING 2019 |
67CHRISTOPHER J. HEATHERLY : IAN MELENDEZ
back to several Russian citizens including one Aleksandr Kalinin of St. Petersburg, Russia.
Kalinin had previously stolen millions of credit card numbers and placed malware on major
American corporations like Dow Jones, 7-Eleven, JetBlue, and JC Penny.
[13]
US federal pros-
ecutors charged Kalinin and his co-conspirators with the attack although he has thus far
avoided prosecution.
[14]
According to a report on Business Insider, “the NSA recognized
the malware from a previous version, built by Russia’s main spy agency. However, this
time it was much more dangerous–it had the ability to disrupt the entire network, poten-
tially wiping out Nasdaq altogether.”
[15]
The Russian methodology of employing hackers, in
lieu of sending them to prison, incentivizes their cooperation and affords Moscow a rather
unique means of recruitment unavailable, or at least unpursued, to other nations.
[16]
Additional reports warn of Russian attempts to hack into the US electric power grid and
natural gas pipelines.
[17]
The impact of these attacks cannot be overstated as they would
cause mass power outages or damage the physical infrastructure itself. The threat of and
resultant damage from cyber security failures continues to be of national significance with
many more high-profile attacks making headlines.
Current U.S. Army Cyber capability and training
The US military has its own cyber units, education and training, although for the purposes
of this paper, we will primarily focus upon the Army. The first Army unit formally stood
up for this new brand of warfare was the U.S. Army Cyber Warfare Command which was
founded in 2010. The Army later designated this unit as an Army Service Component
Command in 2016, authorizing it to “gather resources to organize, develop, and employ
cyber capabilities in support of the Joint Force.”
[18]
During testimony before a Subcommit-
tee of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on emerging threats and capabilities
in 2015, then ARCYBER Commanding General LTG Edward Cardon said, “After a detailed
study, the Army determined it needs 3,806 military and civilian personnel with core cyber
skills.”
[19]
LTG Cardon further stated the Army would have 41 Cyber Mission Force team,
working for the global combatant commanders, in the active component with an additional
21 Cyber Protection Teams in the National Guard or Army Reserves by the end of Fiscal
Year 2016.
[20]
To effectively meet the threats on the cyber battlefield, the Army projects it
will need an additional 355 officers, 205 warrant officers and 700 enlisted soldiers in the
ranks. This number, combined with the planned 3,000 civilian contractors, will provide
the Army with a more robust force both in terms of size and domain knowledge.
[21]
Recog-
nizing the need for cyber leaders, the Army began commissioning new lieutenants directly
into the newly created Cyber Branch. The Army has also issued calls for branch transfers
to Cyber Branch of more senior officers, up to the rank of colonel, who already possess the
skills, education and training required to meet the demands in this field.
For the bulk of the Army’s non-cyber branch personnel–in other words the rank and file
soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers in the Active Duty, National Guard and

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THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEWEVERY SOLDIER A CYBER WARRIOR: THE CASE FOR CYBER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
U.S. Army Reserve components–cyber training consists of the online “Cyber Awareness
Challenge.” Taken annually, the Cyber Awareness Challenge is presented in a chapter for-
mat with the goal of “providing enhanced guidance for online conduct and proper use
of information technology by DoD personnel, simulates the decisions that Federal gov-
ernment information system users make every day as they perform their work.”
[22]
Test
takers are awarded notional digital trophies for properly answering questions posed in a
set of scenarios involving common work-related tasks. Although described as “first-person
simulations and mini-games that allow the user to practice and review cybersecurity con-
cepts in an interactive manner,” the actual training received is limited in scope and value
to leaders.
[23]
However, the Cyber Awareness Challenge provides no information on more
advanced enemy cyber capabilities, nor US offensive or defensive cyber capabilities lead-
ers will need in future operations.
Future Army officers enrolled in the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) re-
ceive some cyber instruction during their two to four years of military science education
prior to earning their commission as lieutenants. There are 275 primary Army ROTC pro-
grams at universities and colleges across the US that train approximately 30,000 cadets
and commission over 5,000 new officers per year. For most college students, ROTC is also
their first encounter with the unique demands of military life and the formative experi-
ence beginning their careers as commissioned Army officers. As such, it is the largest
source of new Army officers and should be, and indeed must be, the formative step in
cyberwarfare training. In addition to taking the same Cyber Awareness Challenge, ROTC
cadets also receive one class describing the new cyber branch career field. The authors see
this as a prime opportunity to shape the future cyber ability of the force well in advance of
their actual entry into military service.
Upon commissioning from ROTC, new lieutenants attend further schooling at a Basic Of-
ficer Leader Course (BOLC) based upon their respective branch, i.e., Armor, Military Intel-
ligence, etc. While individual BOLC schools provide specialized training pertinent to their
chosen fields they all share a common core of education required for any commissioned
officer. The authors spoke with several new officers attending BOLC while researching this
paper and found none of them had received any cyber training beyond the Cyber Aware-
ness Challenge. This deficit is a glaring gap in officer education given these soldiers will
serve as the Army’s leadership for the next thirty or more years into the future. Failure
to institute an appreciation for operational advantages and dangers of cyberwarfare now
will create challenges in cyber application throughout the entirety of their service careers.
Examination of another level of the officer education system (OES) reveals the same
problem exists at other levels. The top half of the Army officer corps are centrally selected
to attend the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), sometimes called Intermediate
Level Education (ILE), usually in their eight to tenth year of military service. This course

SPRING 2019 |
69CHRISTOPHER J. HEATHERLY : IAN MELENDEZ
is approximately ten months in length for those who attend the resident version. CGSC,
located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has made some inroads to improving cyber to address
the very real threat its graduates will face as they return to the operational force.
Currently, the core curriculum provided to all CGSC students includes a two-hour block
on cyberspace with additional cyber instruction as part of the lessons on Command and
Control and Fires Integration. Additionally, CGSC includes some cyber play in the various
student war game exercises conducted at the end of each major block of instruction. Amer-
ican officers attending CGSC have the option to take a classified cyber elective although
class attendance is limited by security clearance requirements and instructor availability.
This class, which is double the length of a normal CGSC elective course, includes a mix
of classroom instruction, guest speakers and practical exercises.
[24]
While this nascent
initiative is to be applauded, waiting until the midpoint of a military career comes too late
for maximum benefit.
The CGSC’s approach to cyber education further highlights some of the challenges facing
the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) which is responsible for soldier
education. First, the pool of available cyber instructors is limited to those with the prop-
er security clearance, education and experience. The CGSC faculty team, for example, is
largely made up of civilian instructors who retired from active military service before cy-
ber warfare was a standard consideration. No doubt the instructors are dedicated to their
profession and the education of their students, but they will require additional training to
bring cyber relevance to the classroom. The pace of change in cyber warfare is rapid and
will also require the military’s educational platform to quickly develop both courses and
instructors. Nor is cyber training a “once and done” type of learning but instead requires
dedicated study over a career. The classification of the material itself presents a third chal-
lenge. Knowledge of and access to US cyber capabilities must be limited to those with a
verified need to know lest it fall into the hands of US competitors.
Improving Army Cyber readiness
We suggest several actions for the U.S. Army to consider improving its current cyber
capabilities and training. First, the Army must promote the seriousness of the threat to
the entire force and not place the burden to dominate this new domain of warfare on cyber
missioned units. The U.S. Marine Corps has a mindset that every Marine is a rifleman first.
Given that every Soldier has access to personal and government IT systems, smart phones
and the like, the Army must adopt the same mind frame but expand it to include every
soldier is a cyber warrior as well.
This new mindset must begin the moment a civilian recruit steps forward and volunteers
to serve. The Army must adopt an aggressive national cyber recruiting strategy targeting
those citizens with the skill sets demanded by the branch. Similarly, local Army recruiters
must identify qualified applicants for cyber branch positions and explain the unique as-

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THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEWEVERY SOLDIER A CYBER WARRIOR: THE CASE FOR CYBER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
pects of this military occupational specialty (MOS). A suggestion, not without controversy,
is to redirect personnel who are not physically qualified into civilian cyber opportunities
that do not have the same operational demands as uniformed soldiers. This would require
Army recruiters to place civilian applicants but would also contribute to the Army’s overall
ability to hire new personnel. Reducing or eliminating the physical requirements for uni-
formed personnel or the criminal, educational or moral requirements for any Army appli-
cant is categorically rejected by this paper. The Army must further press for more efficient
hiring procedures to bring on the required personnel now. During his Senate hearing, LTG
Cardon relayed the challenges of hiring personnel “given internal federal employment
constraints regarding compensation and a comparatively slow hiring process.”
[25]
Beginning with their initial training and continuing throughout the entirety of their
careers, soldiers must be routinely educated on cyber threats in “hands on classes” taught
by experts who are able to demonstrate the dangers of cyber warfare. Instruction should
be multifaceted across the entire spectrum of threats including improper use of email,
social media accounts, personal cell phones or computers as well as the potential damage
of cyberattack during the conduct of actual military operations. Examples of such effec-
tive training would include case studies based on real soldier cyber incidents, ruthlessly
enforcing operational security (OPSEC) in both garrison duties and field exercises, classes
on security classification regulations and drastically reducing the prevalence of personal
computing or communication devices at home station or deployed locations.
Additionally, the Army must continue to offer incentives to retain the best cyber personnel
in the formation lest we lose them to opportunities elsewhere in the civilian cyber fields.
The introduction of competitive bonuses for reenlisting cyber soldiers like those offered to
the special operations is but one possible solution. While some special forces bonuses top
$150K, the financial and time resources of recruiting and training new cyber personnel
would be much greater.
[26]
Instituting educational partnerships, exchanges or simply sending
cyber personnel to undergraduate, graduate or doctoral programs is another method to train
and retain the best personnel.
The Army should seek outside expertise and solutions by partnering with industry and
educational institutions also combating cyber threats. While hardened infrastructure and
new cyber defense technologies will afford some measure of defense against future attacks,
these are not sufficiently robust or effective to ignore the human component required to
meet the threat. A 2017 Real Clear Defense article neatly sums up this problem stating,
“Promising technologies like artificial intelligence — software that autonomously detects
and thwarts attacks — are fueling investment and innovation but should not be seen as
silver bullets.”
[27]
Simply investing money and energy in the existing paradigms as the
quote would suggest is not enough to remedy the situation and put the military on par or
beyond that of US near-peer adversaries. Utilizing and working alongside existing academic

SPRING 2019 |
71CHRISTOPHER J. HEATHERLY : IAN MELENDEZ
structures brings in a new non-military perspective from citizens who are in many ways
the experts of the cyber field. The University of Dallas, for example, offers undergraduate,
graduate, and post-graduate degrees in the various subfields of cyber. A Master of Science
in Cyber Security from the University of Dallas teaches students a litany of skills including
methods of data protection, legal issues and protections under the law, network security and
digital forensics. Proving the connection between cyberattacks and instigator is incredibly
difficult and one of the most attractive features of cyberwarfare. Increasing the number of
experienced soldiers and civilian contractors armed with the educational background and
experience on tracing digital evidence could provide the definitive evidence required for
the US to defend against or respond appropriately to future cyberattacks.
More pragmatically, leaders must enforce proper communication procedures and cyber
OPSEC in all aspects of a unit’s daily duties whether in garrison or in the field. Commanders
must hold Soldiers accountable, and they themselves must be held accountable, for
violations of standing cyber regulations, rules and laws that threaten the readiness or
operational security of their units. Leaders stating, “it’s too hard” or “I am assuming risk”
and willfully ignoring cyber OPSEC will lead to US casualties or even defeat in warfare
against peer or near-peer opponents.
It is equally important the Army continually fund both cyber units and cyber training
to ensure all soldiers are prepared for cyber warfare. During the Global War on Terrorism,
the Army stood up or expanded numerous capabilities such as counter IED, working dogs,
military transition teams (MITT) or agricultural development teams (ADT) to support com-
bat units lacking these enablers in their organic formations. Many of these same enablers
were reduced as the Iraq and Afghan theaters drew down. Attempts to expand these pro-
grams will long stand up times in any future conflict. Additionally, the Army often failed to
promote or select for higher command the personnel assigned to these units, particularly
those officers commanding MITTs, all but ensuring the “best and brightest” would seek
assignment elsewhere. We cannot afford to make the same mistakes with cyberwarfare.
CONCLUSION
Famed American humorist Mark Twain observed, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it
does rhyme.”
[28]
America will go to war again. The cyber domain will play a prominent,
if not decisive, role in that war. The only questions which remain unanswered are the
opponent, location, and timing of that future conflict. Potential enemies, namely China and
Russia, have already shown a willingness and ability to incorporate cyber into their offensive
and defensive strategies. The Army must be ready – through education, training and
partnership with industry leaders – now to fight and win on the cyber battlefield. This
readiness will be found in the education of the next generation of Army leaders. 

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NOTES
1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, RSA Cyber Security Conference remarks, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/speech-
es/working-together-to-defeat-cyber-threats.
2. The Daily Telegraph, Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for ISIL?, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-how-many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-isil/.
3. The Washington Post, Businessman admits heling Chinese military hackers target U.S. contractors, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/national-security/businessman-admits-helping-chinese-military-hackers-target-us-contractors/2016/
03/23/3e74e4a4-f136-11e5-85a6-2132cf446d0a_story.html?utm_term=.106972b16120.
4. The New York Times, Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/
technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?emc=na&_r=1&.
5. Ibid.
6. The Daily Beast, China Reveals Its Cyberwar Secrets, http://www.thedailybeast.com/china-reveals-its-cyberwar-secrets.
7. Foreign Policy, China’s Hacker Army, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/03/chinas-hacker-army/.
8. The Washington Free Beacon, Report: Chinese Spies Stole Pentagon Secrets, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/re-
port-chinese-spies-stole-pentagon-secrets/.
9. The Christian Science Monitor, How Russia and others use cybercriminals as proxies, https://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/2017/0628/How-Russia-and-others-use-cybercriminals-as-proxies.
10. The New York Times, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html.
11. Business Insider, The Massive Hack of the Nasdaq That Has Wall Street Terrified of Cyber Attacks, http://www.businessin-
sider.com/nasdaq-attacked-by-hackers-2014-7.
12. CNN, Russian hackers placed ‘digital bomb’ in Nasdaq – report, http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/17/technology/security/
nasdaq-hack/index.html.
13. The United States Department of Justice, Russian National Charged in Largest Known Data Breach Prosecution Extradited
to United States, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-largest-known-data-breach-prosecution-ex-
tradited-united-states.
14. NJ Advance Media, Russian hackers plead guilty in N.J. in worldwide $300M credit card scheme, http://www.nj.com/
news/index.ssf/2015/09/russian_hackers_plead_guilty_in_nj_in_worldwide_30.html.
15. Business Insider, The Massive Hack of the Nasdaq That Has Wall Street Terrified of Cyber Attacks, http://www.businessin-
sider.com/nasdaq-attacked-by-hackers-2014-7?IR=T.
16. NJ Advance Media, Russian hackers plead guilty in N.J. in worldwide $300M credit card scheme, http://www.nj.com/
news/index.ssf/2015/09/russian_hackers_plead_guilty_in_nj_in_worldwide_30.html.
17. CNN, Russia attacks U.S. oil and gas companies in massive hack, http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/02/technology/securi-
ty/russian-hackers/index.html.
18. The United States Army, Army Announces ARCYBER as an ASCC, https://www.army.mil/article/171513/army_an-
nounces_arcyber_as_an_ascc.
19. The United States Army, Army may create cyber career field for civilians, https://www.army.mil/article/146485/Army_
may_create_cyber_career_field_for_civilians/.
20. Ibid.

SPRING 2019 |
73CHRISTOPHER J. HEATHERLY : IAN MELENDEZ
NOTES
21. The Army Times, Staffing goal for Cyber branch totals nearly 1,300 officers, enlisted soldiers, http://www.armytimes.com/
news/your-army/2015/06/15/staffing-goal-for-cyber-branch-totals-nearly-1300-officers-enlisted-soldiers.
22. The Center for Development of Security Excellence, CyberAwareness Challenge 2019 for Department of Defense (DoD)
DS-IA106.06, http://www.cdse.edu/catalog/elearning/DS-IA106.html.
23. Ibid.
24. Kurt Vandersteen, email to author, August 8, 2017.
25. The United States Army, Army may create cyber career field for civilians, https://www.army.mil/article/146485/Army_
may_create_cyber_career_field_for_civilians/.
26. The Stars and Stripes, $150,000 bonus offered for some Special Forces, https://www.stripes.com/news/150-000-bonus-
offered-for-some-special-forces-1.75636#.Wa0oEbpuLIU.
27. Real Clear Defense, Will U.S. Cyberwarriors Be Ready for the Next Big Hack?, http://www.realcleardefense.com/arti-
cles/2017/08/17/will_us_cyberwarriors_be_ready_for_the_next_big_hack_112066.html.
28. Good Reads, Mark Twain Quotes, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/5382-history-doesn-t-repeat-itself-but-it-
does-rhyme.